Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Local Realty Company, a corporation v. V.A.
Lindquist and Mary Lindquist, his Wife : Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephens, Brayton & Lowe, and Calvin Behle; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Local Realty Company, a corporation v. V.A. Lindquist and Mary Lindquist, his Wife, No. 6004.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/27

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

K
45.9
.S9

UTAH ... 1PR·ME COURT
..

....

r

In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
LOCAL REALTY COMPANY,
)
a corporation,
Appellant, {
vs.
V. A. LINDQUIST and MARY
LINDQUIST, his wife,

J

No. 6004

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Comes now the Local Realty Company, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant in the above entitled case,
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a
rehearing of this matter upon the following grounds
and for the following reasons:
1. That the opinion of the court is in error for
the reasons hereinafter stated.
2. That the opinion of the court was handed down
on December 17, 1938, at a time when the competency
of one of the Justices concurring in that opinion, and
whose concurrence was necessary to make the prevailing
opinion the opinion of the court, was in question in
certain proceedings which resulted in the resignation

of such Justice on the day that the opinion of the oourt
was handed down.
3. That the Home Owners Loan Corporation, an
Agency of the U. S. of America, and other members of
the Bar interested in the law of real property and mortgages in this state, are perturbed with the opinion of
the court as it now stands and would like to be heard
and render assistance to the court in formulating a
decision in this case.
ARGUMENT.
1. H is diffieult for any lawyer to render a more
eritieal analysis of the errors in the prevailing opinion
as it now stands than has been done by the dissenting
Justices in the above case. It ~would likewise be a useless
expense and duplication to include in this brief such
criticism and accordingly by reference Petitioner adopts
and incorpora tos herein tho opinion of Mr..J nstice ~Wolfe
in this easo in support of its first ground for granting
a rehearing iu this f'aso.

v\r c have considered it elementary that the judicial
reasoning of an impartial tribunal is founded upon the
acceptance of certain facts and legal premises from
which the conclusion and order of the court follows
regardless of whether or not the ond as such may
be that desired in so far as the personal preferences of the members of the tribunal arc coneerned.
This distinguishes judicial reasoning from the argument
and reasoning of the advoeatc ~who to support a desired

result urges reasons to support that result. \V e submit
that the prevailing opinion is a patent violation of these
cardinal prineiples. -While relying upon the detailed
analysis of the dissenting opinion to point this out, may
we stress the following:
(a) Petitioner's case is founded upon the following
Statute of the State of Utah: (R. S. U. 1933, Section
104-37-37) ''The purchaser from the time of sale until
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his
redemption, until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the
property sold or the value of the use and occupation
thereof." It cannot be disputed that Petitioner was
the purchaser at the time of the sale of the property in
question, that there was no redemption, that the defendants were in possession of the property in question, and
that the stipulated sum was the value of the use and
occupation thereof. Under such facts the only question
before the court is whether or not as a matter of law
these defendants, only one of whom was the mortgagor,
were "tenants in possession". If this is so there can
be no escape from the conclusion that there should be
judgment for Petitioner. These identical words have
been construed by the courts of many states and in every
instance it has been held that the words "tenant in possession'' includes a mortgagor in possession. (See cases
cited in briefs and in dissenting opinion; repetition of
these citations and of pertinent wording in these cases
seems to involve unnecessary expense and mere duplieation.)
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Yet the prevailing opnnon states that this Statute
"specifically denies the grant of rents and profits to the
purchaser and expressly recognizes them as the property
aml money of the owner'' when the statute is just the
opposite. (Note dissenting opinion).
The steps to which the writer of the prevailing
opinion ~went to avoid the plain terms of the Utah Statute
and the decisions of cases construing the language
involved, are apparent when one reads the prevailing
opinion and the briefs filed in this case and eontemplates
the initiative of the author in departing from the briefs
and arguments of counsel and discovering that the Utah
Statute adopted in 1870 had adclitional provisions not
he1·e in Vl()lvcd which were not present in the parent
California Statute until two years later. The author
then cites this statutory difference 'in no way in point
to eseape Petitioner's daim that the California Statute
whieh was adopted by Utah in identical words was
adopted free from the construction of this identical
~wording

by the California courts.

\Ve quote from the dissenting opinion:
"Of course it follows thai if as early as 1859
Califoruia held the statute to give to the purehaser the eqnitable title and that he vvas entitled
to the value of the use and occupatio11 from the
mortgagor or former owner <luring the period of
redemption, and we adopted that very language
from the Califomia sial ute in 1870, t!tat we
acloptccl the construction \\'hich tlw c·onri put on
that language. The fad thnt the Califomia statute did 110i adopt 1l1e part about the a<"connt-

ability until 1872 or two years after we took the
portion to which the decision in 1859 pertained
cau make no differeuce, especially in view of the
California case of Petersen v. Jurras, supra,
where the California Court gave the same construction to its statute with the accountability
features added as it did in Harris v. Reynolds,
supra, \vhen they were absent.
"And it becomes not only difficult to ascertain how, but astounding that the opinion can
state that such holding in the McCusker Case was
"without discussion and citing as authority the
Lathrop case, supra, which declined to so hold.''
A glance at the :i\1cCnsker case reveals the following: That not only was the Lathrop Case cited
(which did not "decline to hold" that the judgment debtor was a tenant in possession, but expressly left the question open), but there were
cited Harris v. Reynolds, supra, and Hill v.
Taylor, supra. In fact, the former is quoted
from. Other cases are also cited, but the above
two are definite early authorities on which the
McCusker Case rests.''
(b)

We quote from the dissenting opmwn:

"I think the opinion becomes hopelessly confused in its consideration of the reasons for the
rent money going to the purchaser. 8ince the
opinion lays down the principle that the mortgagor or owner is not only entitled to possession
but has all the rights and attributes of title until
six months after "sale", it of course is precluded
from holding that rents or value of use and occupation and are an incident of the purchaser's
status. But since the rents and value of use and
occupation are given to the purchaser by statute,
some reason must be found in the opinion for
giving these to the purchaser. And what reason
do we find"? That they are given to the purehaser

(j

as an offset to his debt. But the idea occurred to
the opinion writer that in some cases the purchaser might not be the judgment creditor. 8o
there is inserted in parentheses that the purchaser "is in the status of a creditor". I11 the
status of a crcdi tor as to what'! If he never was
a creditor, how can he sueceed to that credit by
bec·oming a purchaser'? How ean a stra11ger to
the note secured by the mortgage who is a purchaser be "in the status of a ereditor?" \\"lty
is he entitled to the renh; and value of usc and
occupation as a credit on an indebtedness which
never existed as to him'? Furthermore, it is
elementary that even the judgment creditor occupies a different status as a purchaser. !lis
judgment is satisfied if the property is bought
in for the debt and costs, and he owns the property, not as judgment creditor but as purchaser.
Why give him credit on an indebtedness which is
no longer owing'? The fad that in case of m istake, \vhere the purchaser is the judgment creditor, there is better opportunity to rectify the
miRtakc by plaeing the parties in status quo does
not make him any the less a purchaser and not
a creditor."
In connec-tion with this subject we treated the question of ti tlc in our original briefs as moot iu this ease
because the basis of Plaintiff's action was Scetion 10437-37. .But how can the reasoning of the prevailing
opinion on this point stand in face of that part of
Seetion 104-:n -:32 which reads: "If the debtor redeems,
the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to
his estate.'' U sclcss words, sinec the Court would have
us understand that the debtor still has his estate! Sec
also the discussion of this problem in the ease of McQueeney v. Toomey ct al., (Montana) 92 Pae. 561, where

statutes ictentieal with those of Utah are construed. The
prevailing opinio11 expressed itself on this point without
benefit of eonnsel; with respect to the result we again
quote from 1lw dissenting opinion:
'''I' he prC\'ailing opinion g"Ol~S 011 to say that
our statute "specifically denies the grant of rents
and profits to the pnn·ltaser and expressly rceoguii'.es them as property and J:wncy of the
owner.'' The statute does not so rn·oyidc. T1
pro,·idcs just the opposite. It provides that they
shall go to the purchm;cr bceausc he has all the
right, tiilc, and interest in the property; but it
further provides that if the owner or other rcdenlptioner redeem, the money so collected by the
purchaser be credited on the redemption price.
'rhis is harmonious with the conception that the
})111' ·baser is eutitlcd to tl1c rents and profits as
;m ineident to his interest, hut that if his eqnitalJle
estate (11ot merely an equity bnt a full right
recognii'.ed in cqnity) whieh he has obtained hy
the purchase, is defeated by redemption, he must
pay over the rents and profits because all he is
entitled to is to recoup his purchase price with
interest. In the anxiety of the opinion to establish the dodriuc that these rents aml value of usc
an(l occupation belonged all the time during the
redemption period to the execution debtor, despite the express statutory provision that the
pnrehascr was entitled to them, we arc told that
they are paid to the purchaser as a credit upon
his debt. And in order to arrive at this conclusion a purchaser who never was a creditor is
b·eated m; a ereditor. Ilc seems to be in the
"status of a ercditor ".

"But it seems to me that the crowning absurdity of the whole reasoning is revealed in the
statement ihat "if there arc any rents due and
owing· io the owner when the deed issues, they

lllay vest in the purchaser or his assigns for he
then is subrogated to and acquires all the right,
title, and interest to everything the owner could
assert with respect to the property; including
title, possession, growing crops, rents," ete. rl,his
is the first instance in the law that I hn ve come
across that rents or profits owing to an owner
before title passes become the property of one
who buys the real estate. But eertainly if the
''sale'' does not become complete until six months
after the "sale" and the rents belong to the
owner, no passage of title by "subrogation"
passes such moneys to the purchaser. Nowhere
in the law can such a principle be discovered. It
reveals the plight the opinion finds itself in in
order to justify the statement that the ownership
of the property remain in the mortgagor for six
months after sheriff's sale rather than in the
purchaser as the statute declares. If the ownership is in the purchaser, it follows naturally that
the rents and value of use and oceupation belong
to him. If his estate in equity is defeated by the
happening of the condition subsequent-to-wit,
redemption-he, by statute, is required to account
and credit on the purchase price the rents whieh,
up to such time, belonged to him.''
(c) We have at no time suggested that a person in
possession of property is not entitled to its use and
occupation. Yet the opinion accuses us of advancing
this "paradox that destroys itself". The question before the Court is whether a statute giving Plaintiff the
right to hold the tenant in possession for the value of
that uso and occupation means what it says. We
contend that if the defendants choose to elect to exercise
their right (in this caso conceded) to possession, thus

becoming entitled to the use and occupation of the

!)

premises, tlwy must, uncler the statute, pay the plaintiff.
If they do 11ot wish to pay, they have the ehoice of not
exercising their option. \V c agam quote from the dissenting opinion:
"rriw r·oJdcn1inu is not 1hni ::sc and o;·cupation C'all be Sl~parnted from IJOssessiou, hut that
the owm•r in possessim1 after sale must acl·ount
for tit(' ,-arue of the u:-:c~ and occupation. The
opi;1iou uselessly sels up and knocks llown a straw
mall, rorg·cttinp; tlw earlier sta1m::ent in the
opinion that Califomia holcls this possession a
mere right of oc·eupancy suhjcc·t to a right in the
purchaser to the value of the use and occupation.
ln the Cali l'ornia case of Petersen v. ,J urras,
supra, it was held that the "right to possession of
the property was not in issue in the case." Likewise', in this ease right to possession is not an
issue, oHly the question of 'whether the purchaser
may n~c·over for the usc ancl oeeupa tiou without
notincation that he intends to do so. 'l'hat is all
that need he deeicled in thiR case.

"The opinion goes on to say: "property is
the right to the use and occupation of a thing or
io the usufrnet ancl enjoyment thereof and without such right there is no sueh thing as property
rights in it. Ownership of property is the right
to enjoy the beneficial interest, the use and oceupation, or to reeeive the usufruet thereof. \Yitbout sueh right there is no ownership. Ruch a
thing- as ownership of realty without benefieial
iuterest or a possession of real property without
right of nse an<l oe<mpancy is au absurdity if not
all in1possihility." Every day owners of property
lease it so as io deprive themselveR of right of
occupmwy or possession. T do not sec, therefore,
that O\\'Jlership \vithm1t right to uRe and oer·upaucy is an "ahsurclity if not an impoRsihility."
But here again as all along in Uw opinion the

10

question of who is the owner during redemption
period is asserted or assumed. I find no valid
reasons given in the opinion. Such reasons would
need to be very convincing in the face of the
language of the statutes which seem expressly to
give the purchaser all the right, title, interest.
and claim of the owner on ''sale'' by the sheriff
and give him by another section the rents or value
of the use and occupation during the redemption
period, and in the face of opinions from every
state having statutes like ours holdiug to the
contrary."
(d) 'J1he prevailing opmwn closes with "three
other reasons why the owner in possession should not
be chargeable with rents during the redemption period."
In our opening brief we tried to point out why these
and other similar reasons had led many legislatures to
change statutes originally identical with those of Utah.

vV e

did not suspect that this Court would use these

reasons-in no way involved in the logic of the legal
proposition before the court-to legislate a result deemed
desimble even by the dissenting justices.

vVe

again

respectfully submit that this is a matter for legislative
attention if the conclusion based upon the facts of this
case coupled with our present law seems socially undesirable.

To burden this brief with the results of ex-

perience leading to contrary conceptions would seem
to be equally inappropriate before this tribunal.

To

support our statement above that some of these reasons
are not here involved, we say as did the dissenting
opinion:

"It happens that the statutes are different."

II

(e) :B'inally, the prevailing opmwn does not deal
diredly with the questiou of the liability of one of the
defendants who was not a mortgagor. \Ve submit that
tl1e opinion :-:hould discuss this point and make definite
the la v,· com~erned, even though it be held that a mortgagor who elects to take possession during the redemption veriod may do so without liability despite Section
] 04-:il'-:17.

But \Ye have already passed beyond our self-imposed
limitation that it would be an unnecessary and therefore
useless ta::-;k to dwell further upon the errors in the prevailing opinion. We respectfully submit that if the
Justice::-; of tl1is Court eonseientiously examine the prevailing all(l disseuting opinions in this case, the briefs
already· tiled, and if necessary the three key cases of
Harris v. Reynolds, ~Walker v. McCusker, and Clifford
& Company v. Henry, the desirability of a rehearing of
this matter will become at once apparent except to those
who will not see.
:2. Likewi::-;e the less said about this ground for
rehearing tlie better, although we submit that a case
involving the differences of opinion in the court itself
and the ramifications and inuendoes of the prevailing
opinion merits a rehearing when the deciding vote was
cast under a eloud.

3. We are authorized to state that without solicitation upon the part of counsel in this case, attorneys for
the Home Owners Loan Corporation and for Utah banks
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and trust companies have requested Petitioner to file this
petition for a rehearing with the thought that if a rehearing is granted they may file briefs as amici curiae.
It seems clear under our decisions that prospective
amici curiae can not of their own volition request a
rehearing or file briefs in support thereof, but such
counsel have indicated their desire to do so if the Court
desires sueh briefs to be filed in advance of itR ruling on
this Petition.

In conclusion may we say that counsel in this case
have no additional fees to be earned by filing this petition, and that no hardship will be rendered any party
in this cause by any delay involved in a more mature
consideration of this interesting and difficult question.
It has been our thought that further consideration of
this case (both by the Court and counsel-see Paragraph
7 of the Conclusions of the dissenting opinion) might
assist in harmonizing the divergent opinions now ready
for the books. In this spirit we respectfully request
that a rehearing be granted.
STEPHENs, BRAYTON

and

CALVIN

& LowE,

BEHLE,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

